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This study investigates the impact of political risk on the cost of capital 
for publicly traded real estate firms. More specifically, by using a 
sample of 102 REITs and listed property trusts, which hold nearly 
6,000 distinct investment properties across the Asia-Pacific region, we 
find strong empirical evidence that increased exposure to political risk 
increases both the cost of equity financing of a firm and its weighted 
average cost of capital. Interestingly, no such linkages are apparent 
between political risk and the cost of debt of a firm. These empirical 
results are robust to a variety of alternative measures of political risk, 
including a: 1) political rights index, 2) political change index, and 3) 
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1. Introduction  
 
Recent empirical evidence highlights the importance of political risk as a 
determinant of the structure and operating characteristics of firms. This 
emerging literature documents that firms self-select into organizational 
structures designed to help them efficiently and effectively manage their 
exposure to such risks. While these findings offer unique insights into the 
structure and operations of cross-border firms, much work remains in 
analyzing and quantifying the economic impact of political risk on various 
dimensions of firm performance. 
 
The purpose of the current investigation is to take one important step down 
that road. Specifically, by using the unique operating environment faced by 
real estate investment trusts (REITs) and listed property companies across the 
Asia-Pacific region, we investigate whether specific and unique aspects of the 
political and regulatory operating environments of each firm materially impact 
the cost of financing for these organizations. In previewing our empirical 
results, we find consistently strong and significant evidence that increased 
exposure to political risk directly increases both the cost of equity financing of 
a firm and its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Interestingly, no such 
relation appears to exist between the political risk exposure of a firm and its 
cost of debt. As will be expounded upon more fully below, we argue that the 
lack of a relation between political risk exposure and the cost of debt is likely 
due (in no small part) to non-price efforts by lenders to manage their risk 
exposure along this dimension. 
 
These findings are of potentially significant importance to both academics and 
market participants, but may be uniquely important within the framework of 
international real estate markets due to both the capital intensive nature of 
commercial real estate investment projects and market segmentation issues. 
More specifically, despite the rapid integration of international capital markets 
and continuing co-integration of international real estate markets, property 
investment decisions often retain a highly localized information component. 
Given the limited substitutability of commercial space across both alternative 
property type usages and geographic locations, effective market analysis often 
requires a micro-level perspective. Additionally, given the relatively large 
scale and financial commitment required to undertake major commercial 
property acquisition or development activities, real estate market participants 
may well be uniquely concerned with the impact of political risk on the cost 
of a firm to obtain the resources necessary to undertake such activities.  
 
The unique regulatory environment faced by real estate firms that choose to 
organize as REITs further heightens the importance of such capital constraint 
issues, as the vast majority of countries impose non-trivial restrictions on the 
ability of such firms to retain income, and hence limit the ability of these 
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firms to endogenously fund firm growth and expansion activities.
 1
 Therefore, 
increased costs of funds may well severely hamper the ability of these firms to 
grow. Finally, unlike in U.S. markets where the majority of REIT investment 
property portfolio holdings are heavily concentrated within domestic markets, 
many publicly traded Asia-Pacific real estate firms hold investment property 
interests outside of the nation in which they are headquartered. As such, we 
view Asia-Pacific property markets as a uniquely compelling laboratory in 
which to examine the relation between the political risk exposure of a firm 
and its cost of capital. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two is a review 
of the existing empirical literature on both political risk and the cost of capital 
within real estate organizations. Section Three is an outline of the data and 
methodological techniques employed to investigate our focal hypotheses, 
while in Section Four, the results of this empirical analysis are provided. 
Finally, Section Five offers a brief summary of our key results and concludes. 
 
 
2. Motivation and Literature Review 
 
Effective real estate investment decision making often requires a complex, 
multifaceted framework, where an intimate knowledge of the idiosyncrasies, 
vagaries, and nuances of localized property markets may well have material 
impacts on the operating characteristics and performance of the individual 
firms that are competing in such markets. The challenges and difficulties 
associated with managing multiple dimensions of inter-jurisdictional 
differences in the legal, regulatory, and political environments of real estate 
organizations may well manifest themselves in either the choice of 
organizational form, or alternatively, be reflected in specific measures of firm 
performance, such as the cost of raising external debt or equity financing. The 
current investigation explores this latter dimension, and specifically 
investigates whether increased exposure to political risk increases the cost of 
debt and/or equity capital for real estate firms across the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
The importance of managing political risk exposure has taken on an 
increasing importance over the recent past, as real estate markets have become 
more fully integrated into the broader global capital markets. For example, 
Yunus (2012) demonstrates that major property markets across the globe all 
appear to be co-integrated with the equity markets of their respective home 
country, as well as with both short-run and long-run macroeconomic factors.
2
 
                                                        
1 For example, within the Asia-Pacific region, Australia (100%), Hong Kong (90%), 
Japan (90%), and Singapore (90%) all mandate substantive profit distributions (of net 
income) to retain REIT status. For further information on cross-border differences in 
regulatory requirements that are facing REITS, see Brounen and de Koning (2012). 
2  The cointegration of global real estate and capital markets has generated a 
tremendous amount of research and attention. Key early work in this area includes, but 
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Such integration adds significant complexity to the management, analysis, and 
valuation of real estate firms that are holding international portfolios of real 
property interests. For example, a recent report by Prudential Real Estate 
Investors (see Fiorilla, Kapas, and Liang, 2012) estimates the current size of 
the Asia-Pacific, institutional grade, commercial real estate market at 
approximately $7.2 trillion, with nine separate countries in the region each 
exhibiting aggregate market values in excess of $100 billion.
3
 This same 
report further highlights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, noting an 
expected double digit annualized growth rate in commercial property interests 
over the next decade, leaving the region with an expected real estate market 
capitalization of nearly $20 trillion by 2021, and far surpassing the expected 
stock of commercial investment properties available in either Europe ($13.3 
trillion) or the United States/Canada ($11.5 trillion). Once again, these 
numbers highlight the significance and importance of fully understanding the 
determinants of capital acquisition costs within this market segment. 
 
The size and growth potential of this market motivate the importance of 
understanding how firms operate within this environment. Thus, the next 
question becomes why might we expect political risk to influence the cost of 
raising funds for these real estate firms? Turning to the existing literature for 
guidance, we find several studies that outline the impact of political risk on 
the performance and operating characteristics of both REIT and non-REIT 
firms. For example, La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, and 2002) all demonstrate the 
importance of variation in the business environment of a country in explaining 
corporate behavior, while Fatemi (1988) and Doukas and Pantzallis (2003) 
both document that firms which operate across national boundaries employ 
less leverage.  
 
With respect to real estate firms, the existing literature has primarily focused 
on the diversification effects of international investments with little 
exploration of how variation in the institutional characteristics of international 
investing influences firm operations. For example, Eichholtz (1996) compares 
the diversification benefits associated with cross-border investments and finds 
evidence that international diversification reduces the risk associated with a 
real estate portfolio more than either an equity or debt portfolio. Thus, 
international diversification gains may be uniquely important within real 
estate markets. Similarly, Conover, Friday, and Sirmans (2002) also find that 
                                                                                                                        
is not limited to Liu et al. (1990), Gyourko and Keim (1992), McCue and Kling 
(1994), Li and Wang (1995), Chen et al. (1998), Ling and Naranjo (1999), Phylaktis 
(1999), Quan and Titman (1999), Glascock, Lu, and So (2000), and Stevenson (2000). 
A complete discussion of these works is beyond the scope of the current investigation. 
3 These countries include: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Additionally, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam all have market caps in excess of $20B. 
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international real estate investments offer more diversification benefits than 




Turning to performance, Boer, Brounen, and Op’t Veld (2005) present 
evidence that real estate property companies that are holding international 
properties (i.e., geographically diversified portfolios) are slightly less risky, 
yet have worse risk adjusted performance, than companies that are focusing 
on a single country. Along these same lines, Eichholtz et al. (1998) examine 
the importance of a continental factor in explaining real estate returns and find 
evidence that the returns generated by real estate investments within North 
America and Europe exhibit evidence of a continental factor. On the other 
hand, investments within the Asia-Pacific region are more independent, thus 
suggesting the need to invest across continents to enhance diversification. 
 
Within this context, Geurts and Jaffe (1996) argue that researchers need to 
look beyond naïve diversification strategies (simply investing in various 
countries) and account for the institutional characteristics of the countries 
when looking for diversification benefits. Following this line of inquiry, Bond, 
Karolyi, and Sanders (2002), Ling and Naranjo (2002), and Edelstein, Qian, 
and Tsang (2011) all present evidence that country specific factors are 
important in explaining international real estate returns. That said, given the 
unique positioning and continuing emergence of international real estate 
investments, only a relatively small number of investigations in the existing 
real estate investment trust literature explore such phenomena.
5
 In general, 
these papers tend to confirm the notion that political risk represents a material, 
value relevant source of risk, and thus should be strategically evaluated and 
managed by real estate market participants. With direct regard to Asia-Pacific 
real estate markets, three recent investigations also document the importance 
of political risk on both the operating and financial structure of firms within 
this market segment. 
 
Specifically, Cashman, Harrison, and Seiler (2014a, 2014b) demonstrate that 
Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies with cross-border 
investment property holdings strategically choose the nature of their 
investment advisory function (i.e., internal versus external advisement) by 
trading off the increased agency costs associated with outsourcing decision-
making control and authority against the benefits of collocating decision 
rights with those market participants possessing or having access to location 
                                                        
4 Taking a slightly different tact, Hoesli, Lekander, and Witkiewicz (2004) find that 
real estate, and particularly international real estate, is an effective portfolio 
diversification component within mixed-asset portfolios. 
5 Within real estate markets, we note the existence of a continuing literature stream that 
explores interjurisdictional differences in mortgage contracting terms. For insight into 
these dimensions of political/regulatory risk, see for example, Pence (2006), Ghent and 
Kudlyak (2011), Desai, Elliehausen, and Steinbuks (2013), and the cities contained 
therein.  
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specific soft information. As outlined above, the highly localized nature of 
many real estate markets makes this industry a prime laboratory for 
investigating such relationships. 
 
Similarly, Cashman, Harrison, and Seiler (2014b) demonstrate that REITs and 
listed property companies across this same Asia-Pacific region strategically 
alter their capital structure based upon political risk exposure. Specifically, 
they find evidence that firms that are holding real estate investment properties 
in jurisdictions characterized by high levels of political instability employ less 
debt. Finally, Ling, Naranjo, and Giacomini (2013) further explore 
international capital structure issues in real estate firms and find limited 
support for the notion that firm-level financing constraints (which may well be 
induced by political and regulatory differences across jurisdictions) help 
explain variation in international REIT and listed property company returns. 
Once again, while these findings provide key insight into the importance of 
political risk on firm decisions, they provide little (if any) direct, tangible 
evidence on the effect of such risk exposure on the related constituents of a 
firm and the resulting costs of its continuing operations. One key contribution 
of the current investigation is in taking that next step and relating the political 
risk exposure of a firm to its cost of capital. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
We begin our sample construction by identifying all REITs and listed property 
companies tracked by SNL Financial that trade on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, New 
Zealand Exchange Limited, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock Exchange 
over the period 2000 through 2011. For each firm year, we then calculate the 
cost of equity, cost of debt, and weighted average cost of capital of each firm. 
SNL Financial currently tracks 246 REITs and listed property companies 
across the Asia-Pacific region, which limits our final sample to firms for 
which we can calculate their costs of both debt and equity capital, thus 
resulting in a total sample of 102 listed real estate firms, holding 5,937 distinct 
investment property interests.
6
 As outlined in Table 1, these firms are both 
                                                        
6 SNL coverage captures a large proportion of the publicly traded real estate firms that 
are operating across the Asia-Pacific region, including (at a minimum) the five largest 
REITs in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore as identified by the EPRA 
(2013). As our cost of capital estimates require multiple years of performance data to 
impute, our final 102 firm regression sample is, by construction, disproportionately 
weighted toward older, more established firms that are likely better positioned to 
manage political risk exposure than firms omitted from the final sample. Therefore, we 
view our results as a conservative estimate of the impact of political risk on firm 
financing costs, and urge caution in generalizing our results to the analysis of new 
ventures, or start-up firms, within this market segment. 
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headquartered and hold investment property interests across multiple locations 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
 
Table 1        Firm and Property Location Breakdown 
This table provides a breakdown of the headquarter locations of the real estate firms in 
our sample, as well as the geographic location distribution of all the properties owned 
by the sample firms. 
Country # of R.E. Firms (%) R.E. Firm Years (%) # of Properties (%) 
Australia 22 (21.6) 94 (25) 1,862 (31.4) 
China 5 (4.9) 15 (4.0) 1,424 (24.0) 
Hong Kong 34 (33.3) 141 (37.5) 686 (11.6) 
Japan 2 (2.0) 4 (1.1) 538 (9.1) 
Singapore 32 (31.4) 101 (26.9) 687 (11.6) 
Other 7 (6.9) 21 (5.6) 740 (12.5) 
Total 102 (100) 376 (100) 5,937 (100) 
 
 
Having identified our set of sample firms, we next proceed to measuring the 
cost of capital for each firm on an annual basis. In estimating the cost of 
equity capital of each firm, we embrace the cash flow based nature of many 
real estate investments and employ a modified residual income valuation 
approach as recently outlined and applied to real estate firms by Danielsen et 
al. (2014).
7
 More specifically, we employ the following model: 
 





𝑖=1                                          (1a) 





𝑖=1                                     (1b) 
where: 
Pt = stock price at time 𝑡  
Bt = book value at time 𝑡 
Et[]= expectations based on information available at time 𝑡  
NIt+i = net income at time 𝑡 + 𝑖 
re = cost of equity 
ROE t+i = after tax return on book equity for period 𝑡 + 𝑖. 
 
 
Conceptually, the current market value of a firm may be viewed as its book 
value plus the present value of any future abnormal earnings. In 
operationalizing this model, we employ a three year forward looking window 
for future earnings expectations, assume perfect foresight on the part of all 
                                                        
7  See Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), and 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) for additional insight into the background and 
development of the residual income valuation approach to estimating the cost of 
capital of a firm. 
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market participants such that realized future earnings are assumed to equal the 
consensus forecast estimate by the market of projected future earnings at each 
point in time, and then recursively solve Equation 1b to back out the cost of 
equity financing which satisfies the proffered accounting relation. 
 
With regard to firm borrowing, we estimate the cost of debt for each firm as 
its total interest expense divided by total debt. Both of these values are 
reported directed by SNL Financial. The WACC of each firm is directly based 
on these estimated costs of debt and equity financing, with the capital 
structure weights defined based on the market (as opposed to book) leverage 
ratio of each firm. As illustrated in Table 2, the average cost of equity across 
our 376 sample firm year observations is a relatively stout 19.2%. While this 
number may seem somewhat high to the casual observer, we offer two 
additional points for consideration. First, while this number may seem high by 
U.S. standards, recall that our sample is primarily composed of relatively 
small real estate firms that are operating across a variety of Asia-Pacific 
jurisdictions with varying degrees of political risk and informational opacity. 
Second, while a precise point estimate of the cost of debt and equity capital of 
each firm is obviously desirable, in investigating the linkages and relations 
between the cost of financing of a firm and its political risk exposure, the 
critical component of the analysis is the relative rank ordering of such capital 
cost measures rather than their explicit cardinal values. As such, and given the 
well-established theoretical and empirical precedents in applying these tools 
in prior settings, we are comfortable that our capital cost estimates (at a 
minimum) serve as legitimate proxies for the relative costs of obtaining 
financing for the sample firms. Similarly, while our cost of debt and weighted 
average cost of capital estimates appear roughly in-line with a priori 
expectations, we are again more interested in the relative rank ordering of 
these metrics across firms than their reported magnitudes. 
 
Having constructed estimates of the cost of capital of each firm, we postulate 
that the cost of debt, cost of equity, or weighted average cost of capital of each 
firm takes the following general form: 
 
Cost of Capital = 
 𝑓(Political Risk + Financial/Regulatory Environment + 
Firm Specific Attributes + Real Estate Market Factors + ε).      (2) 
 
In operationalizing this generic framework, we readily acknowledge that each 
of these determinants of firm financing costs may be measured or assessed in 
a variety of different manners. As such, to ensure the robustness of any 
potentially observable relations, we include multiple measures of each 
component cost throughout our empirical analysis which follows. The specific 
metrics that we include are outlined next. 
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Table 2        Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides the basic descriptive statistics (sample size, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum) for the variables considered in the analysis. The 
political rights index is based on surveys with regard to the electoral process, political 
pluralism, and the functioning of the government. The political change index is a 
measure of how political changes in the country will affect business, and the likelihood 
of change happening in the next ten years. The corruption perceptions index is a 
measure of the perceived level of corruption within the operating environment of a 
firm. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable      
rD 376 0.038 0.044 0 0.595 
rE 376 0.192 0.104 0.025 0.300 
WACC 376 0.125 0.065 0.017 0.305 
      
Political Risk Variable      
Political Rights Index 376 0.039 0.022 0 0.070 
Political Change Index 376 -0.570 0.128 -0.760 -0.228 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
376 -0.048 0.05 -0.096 0 
      
Financial/Regulatory 
Characteristic 
     
Legal Origin 376 0.031 0.018 0 0.060 
Business Freedom 376 0.784 0.172 0.431 1 
Bank Dominated 376 0.101 0.302 0 1 
US 10-yr Rate 376 0.040 0.006 0.033 0.048 
Tax Rate 376 0.118 0.101 0 0.332 
GAAP 376 0.154 0.362 0 1 
      
General Firm 
Characteristic 
     
Asset Tangibility 376 0.161 0.188 0.001 1.760 
Total Assets 376 4,298,725 6,701,107 536 47,729,513 
Profitability 376 0.047 0.085 -0.661 0.486 
Growth Options 376 0.807 0.519 0.027 4.503 
Lagged Leverage 376 0.371 0.189 0 0.959 
      
Real Estate Firm Attribute      
Development 376 0.497 0.501 0 1 
Area 376 7,451,531 8,943,630 0 45,904,043 
Secured Debt 376 55.992 40.720 0 100 
Rated Debt 376 0.250 0.434 0 1 
Split Bond Ratings 376 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Asset Age 376 3.787 2.053 1 8 
Repurchases 376 0.016 0.125 0 1 
Operating Leverage 376 1.775 2.720 -4 8 
Lease Payments 376 0.0004 0.002 0 0.021 
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3.1 Political Risk Variables 
 
Political risk exposure may take many forms. For example, substantial 
variation exists across countries with respect to the enforceability of contracts, 
efficiency of government functionality and support of business, regulatory 
burdens and constraints, perceived corruption levels, judicial philosophy and 
consistency, political stability, and the ability (or lack thereof) of government 
agencies to appropriate (i.e., nationalize) private property or otherwise extract 
payments or concessions from international investors. A variety of alternative 
metrics have been proffered and employed throughout the existing literature 
to capture these various dimensions of risk. Given the competing, yet often 
highly correlated nature of these metrics, we choose to measure the political 
risk exposure of each firm by employing three distinct metrics, a: 1) political 
rights index, 2) political change index, and 3) corruption perceptions index. 
The values of each of these firm specific indexes represent the weighted 
average scores of the political risk exposure confronted by each firm on a year 
by year basis. In constructing these metrics, we first determine the percentage 
of the investment property interests of each firm, which are physically located 
in each unique geographic jurisdiction (i.e., country). We then multiply these 
resulting percentages by the country specific index values of each political 
risk metric to create unique political risk exposure scores for each firm on an 
annualized basis. Thus, our political rights, political change and corruption 
perceptions indexes all represent firm specific property portfolio weighted 
average estimates of the political risk exposure of each firm. 
 
More explicitly, these measures are all designed to capture various aspects of 
the political risk exposure associated with the investments of the firms, 
including the efficiency of the political process, likelihood of political change 
that will materially affect the business environment, and perceived level of 
corruption that the firm confronts. Our first metric, the political rights index, 
is estimated by using country specific index values provided by the Economic 
Freedom of the World. This is a survey based measure of the quality of the 
electoral process, political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. 
In general, higher scores represent a lower opinion on the quality of the 
political process, and thus represent an enhanced level of political risk 
exposure for the firm. 
 
Our second metric, the political change index, measures the likelihood of 
political change occurring in a given country within the next 10 years that will 
materially and adversely impact the general business operating environment. 
The raw country scores used to calculate this index are provided by the 
Business Risk Service through their Political Risk Index (PRI). While higher 
raw PRI scores indicate a more business friendly operating environment with 
little chance for turmoil or change, we rescale these raw scores by multiplying 
them by negative one, and again construct the annual index value of each firm 
by using a geographic property weighted average index. Given our rescaling 
of the PRI of the Business Risk Service, higher scores are once again 
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indicative of increased exposure to political risk, as they imply political 
change that will materially affect business is more likely within the next ten 
years. 
 
Our third and final political risk metric is based on the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI).
8
 Following Cashman and 
Deli (2009), we employ a long run average of the TICPI score of each 
country. Once again, as with our political change index, we rescale the TICPI 
score of each country by multiplying it by negative one. Similarly, firm 
specific values for each year are then constructed by multiplying the fraction 
of the investment property portfolio interests of each firm which are held in a 
given country by the rescaled TICPI score of that nation. Under this approach, 
higher corruption perceptions index values indicate a greater level of 
perceived corruption within the country, and hence are hypothesized to be 




3.2 Financial/Regulatory Environment 
 
To ensure that our political risk relations are not driven by the unique financial 
and/or regulatory environment each firm operates within, we next include a 
number of measures related to the operating environment of a firm in each of 
our empirical specifications which follow. For example, we include the 
proportion of the investment property interests of each firm that are located in 
countries with civil law (French and Roman) based legal systems – as 
opposed to (British) common law based frameworks. La Porta et al. (2004) 
conclude legal systems based on common law (British) are generally more 
efficient in securing and enforcing property rights. On the other hand, 
Cashman, Harrison, and Seiler (2014b) contend firms that are investing across 
national boundaries may prefer the enhanced certainty associated with civil 
law based systems, which rely more explicitly on the written rule of law than 
on location specific customs. 
 
Second, we also employ the Business Freedom Index from the Heritage 
Foundation to control for variation in the operating environment of each firm. 
As with the aforementioned political risk measures, our Business Freedom 
Index represents a weighted average index based on the number of investment 
property holdings located within each country. Higher values indicate 
                                                        
8  See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 for 
complete details on the construction and limitations of this index. 
9 As outlined above, numerous potential measures, or proxies, of political risk have 
been employed throughout the existing literature. Our selection of the three metrics 
employed throughout this investigation was driven by our desire to find distinct 
constructs, all measuring different component pieces of political risk, that were 
relatively uncorrelated with one another. None of the pairwise correlations between 
any of our political risk proxies exceed 0.3. As such, we view the consistently 
significant relations between these three alternative dimensions of political risk and the 
cost of capital of a firm as evidence of a robust underlying economic linkage. 
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enhanced systematic support for business operations, and thus are 
hypothesized to be associated with lower capital costs for the sample firms. 
Third, we also control for whether the underlying economic system of the 
country in which each firm is headquartered is bank dominated, as opposed to 
market dominated. Firms headquartered in these bank dominated countries 
may disproportionately rely on debt financing, as their access to well-
functioning equity markets may be limited. As outlined in Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (1999), an ongoing and unresolved debate continues in the literature as 
to whether “markets or bank-based intermediaries are more effective at 
providing financial services”.
10
 While the current investigation is not designed 
to resolve this debate, to control for potential variation across alternative 
market structures, we create an indicator variable set equal to one for all firms 
headquartered in countries which are bank dominated. Consistent with the 
prior literature, we define a country as bank dominated if the ratio of domestic 





Fourth, as the cost of capital is likely to be influenced by general worldwide 
interest rates, we must identify an appropriate proxy for their level. While 
arguments can clearly be made that country specific, government bond rates 
could be employed as a benchmark, given the integration of worldwide capital 
markets and varying levels of sovereign risk associated with countries across 
the Asia-Pacific region, we choose to employ the 10-year, constant maturity 
U.S. Treasury rate as a more appropriate proxy for risk-free, market-wide 
interest rates. Over our sample period, this benchmark risk-free rate averaged 
4.0%. Fifth, to capture the potential influence of country specific fiscal policy 
on real estate investment decision making, we also control for the corporate 
tax rate that corresponds to the country of incorporation of each firm. As 
interest expense is generally tax deductible, higher tax rates may incentivize 
firms to rely more heavily on debt financing.
12
 Sixth and finally, as the 
accounting statements of a firm may influence its perceived valuation, and 
hence its ability to raise capital, we control for the choice of accounting 
convention made by the firm. Specifically, we create a zero/one indicator 
variable that identifies firms which choose to report their financial statements 
by following the rules based on generally accepted accounting principles 
                                                        
10 A broad literature exists that addresses the dynamics and differences between bank 
dominated and market dominated economic systems. For further details, discussion, 
and analysis of these issues, see Allen and Gale (2001), Levine (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (1999 & 2004), and Chakraborty and Ray (2006).  
11 Alternative cut-off values, or the employing of alternative classifications provided 
by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999 & 2004), produce virtually identical results. 
12 See, for example, Senbet (1979), for further discussion of the role of international 
tax differentials on firm financing decisions. Furthermore, while many sample firms 
enjoy some level of tax transparency (46% have elected REIT status, with many others 
are employing alternative tax advantaged organizational forms), country level 
corporate tax rates may serve more broadly as a proxy for the overall fiscal 
environment of the country. 
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(GAAP) as opposed to the principles based International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). To the extent that one convention is more informative, we 
would expect lower capital costs for firms that select that method. 
 
3.3 General Firm Characteristics 
 
In addition to controlling for the operating environment of a firm, we also 
control for firm characteristics that have been previously shown to influence 
firm financing decisions. In doing so, we separate these attributes into general 
firm characteristics which have been shown to alter capital costs across 
various industries, and real estate firm attributes which are of potentially 
unique importance for firms that are heavily invested in real property markets 
or related interests. Beginning with these general firm attributes, the existing 
literature provides both theoretical justification and empirical evidence for the 
notion that tangible assets serve as more effective collateral than their 
intangible counterparts. Evidence consistent with this view is provided by, 
among others, Myers (1977 and 1984), Williamson (1988), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Jaffe (1991), Pulvino (1998), Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Barclay, Smith, and Morellec (2006), and 
Brown and Marble (2009) for the broad cross-section of firms, as well as by 
Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010), and 
Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) within real estate markets. The presence 
of effective collateral is likely to reduce the cost of capital of a firm – 
regardless of the metric employed. 
 
Similarly, larger firms are generally associated with enhanced stability. This, 
in turn, decreases their likelihood of bankruptcy, and thus, should reduce their 
cost of capital (Rajan and Zingales (1995)).  Within the context of real estate 
markets, support for this proposition is found in, among others, Brown and 
Riddiough (2003). Specifically, they find direct and significant evidence that 
the securities of larger real estate firms are both more stable and more liquid 
than those offered by smaller firms within this industry. Taken together, these 
findings suggest a negative relation between the size of a firm, including Asia-
Pacific real estate companies, and its cost of capital.  
 
Continuing, more profitable firms should also see a reduction in their cost of 
capital, as firms with greater earnings should be less likely to encounter 
financial distress. In turn, this reduction in the probability of declaring 
bankruptcy by a firm should reduce its cost of capital, again, regardless of the 
specific metric employed to examine financing costs. On the other hand, 
higher observed profit levels may be the by-product of investing in riskier 
ventures which demand a higher rate of return. To the extent that our 
profitability metric reflects the risk-return trade-off proposition within the 
investment property portfolio of a firm, higher levels of profitability may well 
be associated with an increased cost of capital for the firm. With regard to 
growth options, we argue that real estate firms with enhanced growth potential 
are likely to be more attractive to equity investors, and thus reduce their cost 
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of equity financing. On the other hand, as creditors do not typically get to 
share in the upside gains associated with abnormal firm growth or future 
profitability, we could easily foresee firms with high growth expectations that 
exhibit an enhanced level of both cashflow and valuation uncertainty, and thus 
exhibit an increased cost of debt. Similarly, the level of growth options of a 
firm may also be positively associated with its broader costs of financing, as 
growth options are likely to serve as less efficient collateral than either 
existing real property interests or projects already within the development 
pipeline of a firm. 
 
Finally, as many firms either explicitly target or implicitly gravitate toward a 
target capital structure, we also control for the use of leverage by a firm within 
its capital structure. All else the same, as debt increases the uncertainty of 
future cash flows, an increased use of financial leverage by our sample real 
estate firms should be associated with an increased cost of both debt and 
equity financing. We next turn to an examination of the firm characteristics 
which are unique to real estate companies and markets that may also influence 
the capital costs of a firm. 
 
3.4 Real Estate Firm Attributes 
 
In the preceding section, we outlined the potentially superior nature of 
tangible assets as collateral for securing financial obligations. Given the 
nature of many real estate investments, such issues may well be uniquely 
important within this industry. Thus, in addition to controlling for the level of 
tangible assets of a firm as outlined above, we also include a zero/one 
indicator variable that identifies firms which are actively engaged in real 
estate development activities. The real assets associated with development 
projects are likely to provide more efficient collateral than the informationally 
opaque contracts often associated with managing and operating existing 
properties.  
 
Similarly, while firm size was mentioned above as a potential determinant of 
firm financing decisions, within real estate markets, the geographic scope of 
the investment holdings of each firm may also influence firm level decision 
making. As such, we control for the size of the geographic area encompassed 
by the investment property holdings of the firm. In estimating this scope of 
operations (Area), we first identify the latitude and longitude of every 
property interest held within the investment property portfolio of each sample 
firm, and then use the maximum and minimum latitudes and longitudes of the 
individual properties held within each firm specific portfolio to determine the 
geographic area (i.e., rectangle) covered by the properties of the firm. The 






∗ 𝑅2 ∗ | 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑙𝑎𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑠𝑖𝑛 (𝑙𝑎𝑡_𝑚𝑖𝑛)| ∗ |𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑚𝑖𝑛|    (3) 
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where R is the radius of the earth, lat_max is the maximum latitude coordinate 
for any investment property interest held within the investment property 
portfolio of the firm, and lat_min is the minimum latitude coordinate 
observable within the investment property portfolio of the firm. Similarly, 
long_max and long_min represent the maximum and minimum longitudinal 
coordinates, respectively, observed within the investment property portfolio 
holdings of each firm. Note that it is clearly possible that by spreading 
property interests over a larger geographic area that firms can lower their cost 
of capital by diversifying away the idiosyncratic risk associated with any one 
particular geographic location. On the other hand, managing and monitoring 
properties across a larger geographic area may well both increase coordination 
problems and engender incentive (agency) conflicts which would be more 
easily avoided in firms with more geographically concentrated property 
holdings. 
 
Based on the findings of the previous literature, we also note that the debt 
financing structure of a firm could potentially influence its cost of capital. To 
control for these potential influences, we include three additional metrics in 
our empirical analysis: 1) the proportion of the outstanding debt of a firm 
which is secured by real property collateral or other claims against specific 
company assets, 2) the presence of rated debt within the capital structure of 
the firm, and 3) a zero/one indicator variable that identifies firms that are 
characterized by split bond ratings on their outstanding, publicly traded debt 
obligations. These debt characteristics are all likely to reflect the amount of 
information that the market has about the firm and its operations. For 
example, secured debt financing should provide creditors with a more precise 
indication of the nature and value of the recourse available to them in the 
event of financial distress by the firm. Similarly, if the firm already has 
publicly traded debt outstanding, it has likely already committed itself to fully 
and openly disclosing its true financial and operating position to the market 
place. Such actions likely make it easier for the market to have a clear 
understanding of the operations of the firm and potential for the future. Each 
of these attributes would thus be expected to potentially lower the cost of 
capital (particularly debt related claims) for the sample firms. Conversely, 
split bond ratings likely reflect disagreement amongst market participants, 
observers, and analysts with regard to the profitability of future firm 
operations. Such uncertainty, or divergence of opinion, may well be 
manifested in the form of higher capital costs for the sample real estate firms. 
 
Along these same lines, the longer a given physical investment property has 
been in operation, the more time the market place has to fully understand the 
nature of the operations and cash flows of the building. Thus, while new 
properties may well be expected to command higher market rents and values, 
we anticipate asset age will be directly associated with information 
availability, and thus a reduced cost of capital, holding everything else 
constant. Finally, in recognizing the potentially complex nature of financial 
contracting relations that may materially influence both the existing financial 
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structure and related costs of the organization, as well as influence its future 
operating flexibility, we explicitly control for three additional characteristics 
of the sample firms. First, we control for whether the firm recently 
repurchased outstanding shares of its existing common stock. The decision of 
a firm to repurchase its shares may well provide a credible signal to the 
market place that company insiders believe its current share price is too low, 
and thus its current cost of capital in too high. Thus, we anticipate that the 
combination of the signal, and the increase in the share price that typically 
accompanies share repurchases, may well drive down the cost of capital for 
sample firms that are undertaking such activities. Similarly, financial and 
operating leverage are often viewed as substitutes with respect to leveraging 
firm attributes to maximize long-run performance. Thus, the use of operating 
leverage and/or long-term capital leases may well reduce the cost of capital of 
a firm, as they may provide an alternative means of financing to mitigate the 
amount of external funding that the firm requires directly from the open 
market. Therefore, throughout our empirical specifications which follow, we 
explicitly control for both the use of operating leverage by each firm and its 
existing commitments on capital lease obligations (as a percentage of total 
assets). 
 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics -- Sample Firm Attributes 
 
As mentioned above, each of these sample firm characteristics were either 
obtained directly from, or constructed by using, accounting and financial data 
from SNL Financial. A detailed description of the construction of each 
variable is provided in Appendix A, while descriptive statistics on each of 
these metrics are provided in Table 2. An examination of these descriptive 
statistics reveals relatively few surprises. For example, consistent with 
previous studies of Asia-Pacific property markets, the sample firms exhibit an 
average market capitalization of nearly $4.3 billion, appear relatively 
profitable with an average funds from operations (FFO) to total assets ratio of 
4.7%, employ almost 40% debt within the capital structure of the firm, and are 
perceived to have a somewhat limited ability to internally finance available 
growth options as the average market to book ratio across sample firms is only 
0.807.
13
 Each of these metrics is very much in line with the findings of 
previous research and gives us confidence that our sample firms are 
representative of the broader universe of real estate firms that are operating 
across the Asia-Pacific region.
14
 
                                                        
13 Note that while our sample firms exhibit an average market capitalization of over $4 
billion, this number is driven markedly higher by a small number of very large sample 
firms. Perhaps a better measure of the size of a typical real estate firm within this 
market place would be the median market cap. The median market cap across the 
sample firms is, not surprisingly, substantively lower at just under $2 billion. This 
latter number is much more in line with real estate firms headquartered within the 
United States. 
14 Our initial SNL sample comprised 246 firms, 113 of which had elected REIT status. 
As a point of reference, Brounen and de Koning (2012) identify a universe of 175 total 
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Turning to our firm attributes which are uniquely important within the real 
estate industry, we once again find that our sample characteristics conform to 
both expectations and previous research findings. For example, as shown in 
Table 2, our sample real estate firms make extensive use of collateralized 
borrowing, with over half of all outstanding debt claims secured by real 
property collateral or other specifically pledged company assets. Additionally, 
while only one-quarter of the sample firms have outstanding debt which has 
even been rated by one of the major bond rating services, these obligations 
appear to be somewhat informationally opaque, as 5.1% of sample firm year 
observations exhibit divergent (i.e., “split”) bond ratings at the notch level 
across alternative rating agencies.
15
 Taken together, these results suggest that 
more than 1 in 5 sample firms with publicly traded, rated debt outstanding are 
characterized by information uncertainty issues large enough to result in split 
bond ratings. Interestingly, these information barriers do not appear to be 
driven by creative financing arrangements within the capital structure of the 
firm, as the sample firms make scant usage of either share repurchases or 
lease arrangements. On the other hand, sample firms do employ substantial 
operating leverage (as well as financial leverage discussed above). Finally, it 
appears that our sample firms are very evenly split between real estate 
development and real estate operating companies, with 49.7% of the sample 





The comparative portion of our analysis begins with a series of univariate 
tests of differences in the capital costs faced by real estate firms across 
alternative political risk exposure environments. The results of this univariate 
analysis are presented in Table 3. Specifically, we divide our sample into 
terciles along each of our three core dimensions of political risk (political 
rights, political change, and corruption). We then compare the cost of debt, 
cost of equity, and weighted average cost of capital across the high, medium, 
and low risk terciles along each of these three dimensions. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the results of this analysis offer very mixed results with respect 
to the relation between political risk exposure and the financing costs of the 
firm. 
                                                                                                                        
REITs as of their study date, while the EPRA (2013) covers 213 real estate firms 
across these same markets. Thus, our sample encompasses a solid proportion of the 
publicly traded real estate companies across this region. In the interest of full 
disclosure, Appendix B presents a listing of the 102 firms in our final regression 
sample based on their headquarter locations. 
15 Notch level differences imply ratings of, for example, BBB and BBB+, by alternative 
rating agencies would be defined as a split rating. 
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Table 3        Univariate Analysis 
This table provides the mean values and univariate tests of differences in the means for our cost of capital estimates 
disaggregated by the relative political risk exposure of the firm.  High risk exposure firms are those in the upper 



















       
Political Rights       
rD 0.028 1.06 0.035 3.63*** 0.052 4.47*** 
rE 0.202 0.50 0.208 -3.17*** 0.166 -2.78*** 
WACC 0.127 1.02 0.135 -2.52*** 0.113 -1.71*** 
       
Political Change       
rD 0.041 -1.03 0.035 0.55 0.039 -0.39 
rE 0.168 1.86* 0.192 1.82* 0.216 3.77*** 
WACC 0.118 -0.71 0.113 3.94*** 0.144 3.08*** 
       
Corruption Perceptions       
rD 0.047 -2.02** 0.034 0.10 0.034 -2.73*** 
rE 0.179 0.54 0.186 1.91* 0.211 2.42** 
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Specifically, in focusing on comparisons between the high and low risk 
terciles, Table 3 shows that while seven of the nine tests identify statistically 
significant differences, only four of these seven are directionally consistent 
with increased risk exposure raising capital costs. For example, consider our 
political rights index. Higher index values along this dimension are associated 
with increased political inefficiencies. Thus, our observed positive relation 
between risk exposure and the cost of debt of the firm is consistent with 
expectations. On the other hand, both our cost of equity and weighted average 
cost of capital appear to decrease in the presence of such political 
inefficiencies – a result directly at odds with our hypothesized focal relation. 
Conversely, when examining both our political change and corruption 
perceptions indexes, we find exactly the opposite sign pattern. More 
specifically, the cost of debt appears to be negatively related to both of these 
political risk metrics, while both the cost of equity and weighted average cost 
of capital increase in the presence of higher political risk exposure. One may 
be tempted to conclude from these results that there is a lack of a clear relation 
between the cost of capital of a firm and its exposure to political risk. Yet 
recall that these are only univariate results. While these descriptive and 
univariate statistics provided in Tables 2 and 3 provide important insights into 
the nature of the real estate firms that are operating across the Asia-Pacific 
region, to fully investigate the relation between political risk exposure and the 
cost of capital of a firm requires a multivariate context which controls for a 
broader array of factors including both the operating environment and firm 
characteristics of a firm. Therefore, Tables 4 - 6 examine the relation between 
the cost of capital of a firm and its exposure to political risk in just such a 
multivariate setting. 
 
To begin, Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate analysis of the cost of 
debt of a firm and political risk exposure. Unlike in the univariate analysis, 
where the cost of borrowing increases with political inefficiencies, is 
unaffected by exposure to political change, and decreases with the perceived 
level of corruption, within this multivariate setting, we find no significant 
relation between the cost of debt of a firm and its exposure to political risk – 
regardless of which metric is employed. More specifically, Column I employs 
our (property weighted) political rights index as a measure of political risk 
exposure of each firm, Column II employs the (property weighted) political 
change index, and Column III employs the (property weighted) corruption 
perceptions index. While all three metrics are directionally consistent with our 
proposed focal hypothesis, none are statistically significant at conventionally 
accepted levels.  One possible explanation for this finding is the potentially 
endogenous nature of the relation between the political risk of a firm, its use 
of leverage, and its cost of debt. Cashman, Harrison, and Seiler (2014b) 
document that political risk reduces the amount of financial leverage real 
estate firms across the Asia-Pacific region choose (or are allowed) to employ. 
Unreported supplementary results confirm that within our sample, real estate 
firms with less exposure to political risk do indeed employ more financial 
leverage, on average, than their counterparts with greater exposure to political 




 This suggests that real estate firms across this region may well trade off 
political risk for financial risk, and that the cost of debt is ultimately a 
function of both. 
 
Table 4        Determinants of the Cost of Debt for Asia-Pacific Real Estate 
Companies 
This table presents the results of three regressions that are used to investigate the 
determinants of the cost of debt financing of Asia-Pacific real estate firms.  The 
models regress the cost of debt of a firm against our three measures of political 
risk, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm 
and industry level variables. In Model (1), the political rights index is used. In 
Model (2), the political change index is utilized, while Model (3) employs our 
corruption perceptions index.  The t-tests reported in parentheses are all based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
    
Intercept 0.044 0.042 0.035 
 (1.30) (1.25) (1.20) 
    
Political Risk Variable    
Political Rights Index 0.205   
 (0.56)   
Political Change Index  0.004  
  (0.17)  
Corruption Perceptions Index   0.080 
   (1.63) 
    
Financial/Regulatory 
Characteristic 
   
Legal Origin -0.837 -0.578*** -0.608*** 
 (-1.53) (-2.97) (-2.85) 
Business Freedom -0.032 -0.027 -0.024 
 (-1.10) (-1.05) (-0.93) 
Bank Dominated -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.07) (-0.21) (-0.19) 
US 10-yr Rate 0.027 0.049 0.173 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.36) 
Tax Rate -0.053 -0.050 -0.051 
 (-1.48) (-1.38) (-1.47) 
GAAP 0.012 0.013 0.013 
 (0.96) (1.01) (1.12) 
    
General Firm Characteristic    
Asset Tangibility 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.29) 
Total Assets/ 1,000,000 -0.007* -0.007** -0.007* 
 (-1.95) (-1.99) (-1.97) 
(Continued…) 
                                                        
16 Additionally, we note that we obtain qualitatively similar results in regressions by 
using both fixed and random effects designed to account for such endogeneity 
concerns. 
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(Table 4 Continued) 
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
Profitability 0.023 0.025 0.033 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.32) 
Growth Options 0.033 0.033 0.033 
 (1.31) (1.30) (1.31) 
Lagged Leverage 0.043 0.042 0.044 
 (1.55) (1.56) (1.59) 
    
Real Estate Firm Attribute    
Development -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.04) 
Area/ 1,000,000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.85) 
Secured Debt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.71) 
Rated Debt -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.47) 
Split Bond Ratings 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.92) (0.88) (0.84) 
Asset Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (2.17) (2.24) (2.30) 
Repurchases -0.009 -0.007 -0.009* 
 (-1.33) (-1.23) (-1.68) 
Operating Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.65) 
Lease Payments 1.383 1.365 1.360 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.53) 
    
Observations 376 376 376 
R-Squared 0.251 0.250 0.252 
Property Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *** Indicates statistical significance at one percent level, ** Indicates 
statistical significance at five percent level, * Indicates statistical 
significance at ten percent level. 
 
 
By briefly examining the significant control variables contained within these 
regressions, consistent with the arguments of Cashman, Harrison, and Seiler 
(2014b), we find some evidence that borrowing costs are lower for firms that 
are holding higher proportions of their investment property assets in countries 
that follow civil law based legal systems. As outlined above, judicial systems 
within these countries tend to more explicitly rely on the written rule of law, 
which may well reduce uncertainty for international investors and lenders not 
intimately familiar with local market knowledge, customs, and/or business 
practices. Similarly, consistent with the arguments and findings of both Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Brown and Riddiough (2003), larger firms appear to 
enjoy (marginally) lower costs of debt. Finally, older buildings appear to serve 
as less effective collateral than their newer, more modern counterparts. This 
suggests the value premium attached to newer facilities outweighs the 
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marginal benefits associated with the resolution of uncertainty that surrounds 
the acceptance and profitable operations of a building within the marketplace. 
The remaining control variables fail to attain statistical significance at 
conventionally accepted levels, and thus we choose not to further expound on 
these null results. 
 
Continuing, Table 5 is an examination of the relation between the cost of 
equity and the political risk exposure faced by the firm. Once again, our 
property weighted political rights index (Column I), political change index 
(Column II), and corruption perceptions index (Column III) serve as the focal 
variables of interest. As with our preceding cost of debt analyses, these 
multivariate results markedly differ from the univariate findings. More 
specifically, within this multivariate analysis, we find a significant positive 
relation between the cost of equity of a firm and its exposure to political risk, 
regardless of the political risk proxy examined. Perhaps most interesting, the 
strongest statistical relation is evidenced between our political rights index 
and the cost of equity. Within our univariate context, the relation between 
these two variables exhibits an unexpected negative sign. While we have little 
to offer in the way of a rational explanation for such a complete change in 
sign pattern, we do note that the more sophisticated multivariate results 
(across all three metrics) are entirely consistent with our focal hypothesis, and 
a priori expectations, that enhanced exposure to political risk should increase 
the cost of financing for Asia-Pacific real estate firms. 
 
With respect to our control variables, the majority of these measures are again 
statistically insignificant, thus requiring little comment. Of those remaining 
attributes that exhibit consistently significant explanatory power over the 
financing costs of the firm, the relations generally comport with expectations. 
For example, larger firms, as well as those with enhanced growth options, or 
those that hold investment property interests across a broader geographic area, 
all exhibit reduced costs of equity. On the other hand, equity costs appear to 
increase for firms that are operating in countries with higher tax rates and 
nations with market, as opposed to bank, dominated economic systems. 
Interestingly, our asset age metric is once again statistically significant; 
however, in direct contrast to the results reported for borrowing costs, asset 
age appears to reduce the cost of raising external equity. One potential 
explanation for these seemingly contradictory results may be found in the 
residual nature of the equity claim. While age may well have offsetting costs 
and benefits, for higher priority debt claims, the value premium associated 
with newer construction may outweigh the uncertainty resolution associated 
with long-run market acceptance and profitability. For equity claimants, the 
long-run residual nature of their claims may well alter the dynamics of this 
trade-off, as uncertainty resolutions may provide key insights into value 
potential and long-run welfare maximization as opposed to simple risk 
management and short-run assurance of payment. Lastly, Table 5 again 
provides limited evidence in support of the notion that more explicit civil law 
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based judicial systems facilitate lower (equity) capital acquisition costs for 
international real estate market participants. 
 
Table 5        Determinants of Cost of Equity for Asia-Pacific Real Estate 
Companies 
This table presents the results of three regressions that are used to investigate the 
determinants of the cost of equity financing of Asia-Pacific real estate firms.  The 
models regress the cost of equity of a firm against our three measures of political 
risk, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and 
industry level variables.  In Model (1), the political rights index is used. In Model 
(2), the political change index is utilized, while Model (3) employs our corruption 
perceptions index.  The t-tests reported in parentheses are all based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
Intercept 0.317*** 0.303*** 0.256*** 
 (4.33) (3.93) (3.46) 
    
Political Risk Variable    
Political Rights Index 2.343***   
 (4.52)   
Political Change Index  0.075*  
  (1.94)  
Corruption Perceptions Index   0.406** 
   (2.45) 
    
Financial/Regulatory 
Characteristic 
   
Legal Origin -2.903*** 0.135 -0.169 
 (-3.96) (0.40) (-0.49) 
Business Freedom -0.069 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-1.63) (-0.06) (-0.09) 
Bank Dominated -0.044* -0.066*** -0.064*** 
 (-1.79) (-2.66) (-2.64) 
US 10-yr Rate -0.202 0.000 0.709 
 (-0.18) (0.00) (0.63) 
Tax Rate 0.128* 0.152** 0.169** 
 (1.91) (2.22) (2.35) 
GAAP 0.003 0.011 0.018 
 (0.23) (0.72) (1.18) 
    
General Firm Characteristic    
Asset Tangibility -0.024 -0.034 -0.045 
 (-0.48) (-0.64) (-0.85) 
Total Assets/ 1,000,000 -0.020*** -0.018** -0.017** 
 (-3.07) (-2.59) (-2.35) 
Profitability 0.069 0.083 0.124** 
 (1.29) (1.46) (2.17) 
Growth Options -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.071*** 
 (-4.59) (-4.76) (-4.92) 
Lagged Leverage 0.055** 0.041 0.049* 
 (2.04) (1.49) (1.85) 
(Continued…) 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
Real Estate Firm Attribute    
Development 0.012 0.008 0.004 
 (1.00) (0.64) (0.32) 
Area/ 1,000,000 -0.017** -0.020** -0.022*** 
 (-2.22) (-2.60) (-2.80) 
Secured Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) 
Rated Debt 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) 
Split Bond Ratings 0.013 0.011 0.013 
 (0.59) (0.56) (0.69) 
Asset Age -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007** 
 (-3.44) (-2.70) (-2.39) 
Repurchases 0.022 0.036 0.028 
 (0.69) (1.08) (0.87) 
Operating Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.12) (0.27) (0.30) 
Lease Payments -3.272 -3.549 -3.435 
 (-0.93) (-1.00) (-0.98) 
    
Observations 376 376 376 
R-Squared 0.340 0.315 0.323 
Property Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *** Indicates statistical significance at one percent level, ** Indicates 
statistical significance at five percent level, * Indicates statistical 
significance at ten percent level. 
 
 
Finally, Table 6 replicates the preceding analyses by using the weighted 
average cost of capital of the firm as the dependent variable of interest. Not 
surprisingly, given the overall findings across Tables 4 and 5, we find 
evidence of a positive relation between the exposure of a firm to political risk 
and its weighted average cost of capital. Once again, this relation is 
observable regardless of the political risk metric employed – the political 
rights index in Column I, political change index in Column II, or corruption 
perceptions index in Column III. Given the nature of the aforementioned 
relations between political risk and the individual component costs of 
financing, these findings for the weighted average cost of capital of a firm are 
almost tautological by construction, and hence warrant little further comment. 
 
Turning one last time to our control variables, consistent with our previous 
analyses, the financial and regulatory metrics again provide some evidence 
that civil law based judicial systems are associated with lower capital 
acquisition costs, as are real property investments in both bank dominated 
countries and countries with lower tax rates. With respect to firm attributes, 
listed real estate firms that are larger in terms of either total market 
capitalization or the geographic scope of their investment property holdings 
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continue to enjoy reduced capital costs. Similarly, firms with enhanced growth 
options also continue to be characterized by reduced cost of capital estimates. 
Interestingly, within this overall WACC specification, our profitability 
(FFO/Total Assets) metric engenders a positive coefficient. As outlined above, 
this is consistent with efficiently operating real estate investment property 
markets in which higher realized profit levels are associated with increased 
risk-taking, and hence higher expected (and required) capital costs. Taken 
together, these results are broadly consistent with, and supportive of, the 
notion that exposure to enhanced levels of political risk for Asia-Pacific 
REITs and listed property companies manifests itself in the form of increased 
(weighted average) capital acquisition costs for the firm. 
 
Table 6       Determinants of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital for Asia-Pacific 
Real Estate Companies 
This table presents the results of three regressions that are used to investigate the 
weighted average cost of capital determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms.  The 
models regress the weighted average cost of capital of a firm against our three 
measures of political risk, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, 
as well as firm and industry level variables.  In Model (1), the political rights index is 
used. In Model (2), the political change index is utilized, while Model (3) employs our 
corruption perceptions index. The t-tests reported in parentheses are all based on 
standard errors clustered by firm.  
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
Intercept 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.166*** 
 (4.37) (4.28) (3.56) 
    
Political Risk Variable    
Political Rights Index 1.796***   
 (4.65)   
Political Change Index  0.082***  
  (3.24)  
Corruption Perceptions Index   0.171* 
   (1.65) 
    
Financial/Regulatory 
Characteristic 
   
Legal Origin -2.380*** 0.019 -0.254 
 (-4.78) (0.09) (-1.14) 
Business Freedom -0.023 0.037 0.019 
 (-0.94) (1.38) (0.75) 
Bank Dominated -0.028 -0.045*** -0.043** 
 (-1.61) (-2.67) (-2.62) 
US 10-yr Rate -0.425 -0.304 0.063 
 (-0.55) (-0.40) (0.08) 
Tax Rate 0.057 0.067 0.092* 
 (1.35) (1.58) (1.85) 
GAAP 0.005 0.010 0.016 
 (0.50) (0.87) (1.46) 
(Continued…) 
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(Table 6 Continued) 
Variable (I) (II) (III) 
    
General Firm Characteristic    
Asset Tangibility 0.013 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.39) (0.31) (-0.13) 
Total Assets/ 1,000,000 -0.010** -0.009* -0.008 
 (-2.18) (-1.75) (-1.50) 
Profitability 0.131*** 0.141*** 0.159*** 
 (3.26) (3.38) (3.56) 
Growth Options -0.015* -0.016* -0.019** 
 (-1.72) (-1.87) (-2.20) 
Lagged Leverage -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.052*** 
 (-2.76) (-3.06) (-2.88) 
    
Real Estate Firm Attribute    
Development 0.005 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.68) (0.34) (-0.14) 
Area/ 1,000,000 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (-2.87) (-3.20) (-3.57) 
Secured Debt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.09) (-0.87) (-1.00) 
Rated Debt 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.29) (0.43) (0.24) 
Split Bond Ratings 0.011 0.008 0.012 
 (0.98) (0.70) (0.79) 
Asset Age -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 
 (-2.09) (-1.52) (-1.25) 
Repurchases 0.025 0.035 0.034 
 (1.11) (1.41) (1.28) 
Operating Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.22) (0.35) (0.46) 
Lease Payments -3.204 -3.480 -3.303 
 (-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.32) 
Observations 376 376 376 
R-Squared 0.267 0.237 0.228 
Property Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *** Indicates statistical significance at one percent level, ** Indicates 
statistical significance at five percent level, * Indicates statistical 





The past two decades have seen an unprecedented growth in commercial real 
estate markets around the world, including across the Asia-Pacific region. 
This rapid growth, combined with increasingly integrated real estate capital 
markets, have opened up significant new opportunities for REITs and other 
real estate companies to participate in direct property investments across 
international borders. While such investments offer increased profit potential 
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and diversification benefits, they also expose firms to potentially increased 
levels of political risk. 
 
In light of these developments, the current investigation examines the impact 
of political risk on the cost of debt, cost of equity, and weighted average cost 
of capital for publicly traded real estate firms across the Asia-Pacific region. 
More specifically, by using a sample of 102 REITs and listed property 
companies, which hold nearly 6,000 distinct investment properties across this 
geographic region, we find strong empirical evidence that increased exposure 
to political risk increases both the cost of equity financing of a firm and its 
weighted average cost of capital. Interestingly, no such linkages are apparent 
between political risk and the cost of debt of a firm. These empirical results 
are robust to three alternative measures of political risk, including a political 
rights index, political change index, and corruption perceptions index, as well 
as control for firm specific characteristics and attributes of the markets in 
which each firm holds investment property interests. Taken together, these 
results suggest political risk exposure is a material, and value relevant, 
concern for international REITs and listed property companies, which must be 
proactively and strategically managed to ensure the welfare maximization of 
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Appendix A - Variable Definitions 
Political Rights 
Index 
The political rights index represents the property weighted average of 
the Freedom of the World Political Rights Index. Higher values indicate 
a less functional government. 
Political Change 
Index 
The political change index represents the property weighted average of 
the Political Risk Index from the Business Risk Service times negative 
one. Higher values indicate that political change is more likely to 




The corruption perceptions index represents the property weighted 
average of the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency 
International times negative one. Higher values indicate higher levels of 
perceived corruption. 
Legal Origin 
Legal origin represents the percent of the investment properties of a real 
estate company located in countries with civil law based legal systems. 
Business 
Freedom 
Business freedom represents the property weighted average of the 
Heritage Foundation’s Business Freedom Index. 
Bank Dominated 
Bank dominated is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the ratio of domestic assets of deposit money banks to total equity 
market capitalization is greater than 1.10, zero otherwise. 
US 10-yr Rate 
The US 10-yr rate represents the interest rate on the 10-year, constant 
maturity, U.S. Treasury note. 
Tax Rate 
The tax rate represents the highest corporate tax rate applicable in the 
country where the real estate company is headquartered. The tax rate is 
set to 0 for all REITs. 
GAAP 
GAAP is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm uses GAAP financial 
reporting standards, and 0 otherwise. 
Asset Tangibility Total Real Estate Operations / Total Assets.  
Total Assets Represents total assets for each firm, each year, in US dollars. 
Profitability Equals FFO divided by Total Assets. 
Growth Options 
Equals Total Market Capitalization divided by the difference of Total 
Assets and Total Debt. 
Lagged 
Leverage 
Lagged leverage value. 
Development 
This is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm engages in investment 
property development, construction programs, or has an active property 
development pipeline, and 0 otherwise. 
Area 
Area represents the surface area of a lat-long rectangle on a sphere, 
calculated by maximum and minimum latitudes and longitudes of the 
individual properties held within each firm each year to determine the 
geographic area. 
Secured Debt Equals Secured Debt divided by Total Debt. 
Rated Debt 




An indicator variable set to 1 if two or more rating agencies have 
different notch level long-term issuer credit ratings for the firm and 0 
otherwise. 
Asset Age 
Asset age represents the time since the first record of the firm’s total 
assets in SNL. 
Repurchases 
An indicator variable set to 1 if the shares of the firm outstanding 
declines by more than 2% over a given year and 0 otherwise. 
Operating 
Leverage 
Equals ∆FFO divided by ∆Revenue; winsorized. 
Lease Payments 
Equals total committed capital lease obligations of a firm divided by 
Total Assets. 
 




Abacus Property Group 
Aspen Group 
Astro Japan Property Trust 
Australand Property Group 
BWP Trust 
CFS Retail Property Trust 
Challenger Diversified Property Group 
Charter Hall Group 
Charter Hall Office Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
Charter Hall Retail Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
Commonwealth Property Office Fund 
DEXUS Property Group 
FKP Property Group 
GPT Group 
Goodman Group 
ING Real Estate Community Living Group 
Investa Office Fund 
Lend Lease Corporation Limited 
Mirvac Group 
Sunland Group Limited 




Agile Property Holdings Limited 
Guangzhou R&F Properties Company Limited 
KWG Property Holding Limited 
SOHO China Limited 
Shui On Land Limited 
Hong Kong 
Asian Growth Properties Limited 
Champion Real Estate Investment Trust 
Cheung Kong Holdings Limited 
China Overseas Land & Investment Limited 
China Resources Land Limited 
Chinese Estates Holdings Limited 
Country Garden Holdings Company Limited 
Far East Consortium International Limited 
Great Eagle Holdings Limited 
HKR International Limited 
Harbour Centre Development Limited 
Hon Kwok Land Investment Company, 
Limited 
Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, Limited 
Hopewell Holdings Limited 
Hopson Development Holdings Limited 
Hysan Development Company Limited 
Kai Yuan Holdings Limited 
Kowloon Development Company Limited 
Lai Sun Development Company Limited 
Link Real Estate Investment Trust 
Mandarin Oriental International Limited 
New World China Land Limited 
New World Development Company Limited 
Pacific Century Premium Developments 
Limited 
Prosperity Real Estate Investment Trust 
Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited 
Regal Real Estate Investment Trust 
SRE Group Limited 
Shangri-La Asia Limited 
Hong Kong continued 
Shenzhen Investment Limited 
Shimao Property Holdings Limited 
Sino Land Company Limited 
Sunlight Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
Wharf (Holdings) Limited 
 
Japan 
Industrial & Infrastructure Fund 
Investment Corporation 




AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT 
Amara Holdings Limited 
Ascendas India Trust 
Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust 
Ascott Residence Trust 
Banyan Tree Holdings Limited 
CDL Hospitality Trusts 




CapitaRetail China Trust 
City Developments Limited 
First Real Estate Investment Trust 
Fortune REIT 
Frasers Centrepoint Trust 
Frasers Commercial Trust 
Singapore continued 
GuocoLand Limited 
Ho Bee Investment Limited 
Hotel Properties Limited 
K-REIT Asia 
Keppel Land Limited 
Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust 
Overseas Union Enterprise Limited 
Parkway Life REIT 
Saizen Real Estate Investment Trust 
Stamford Land Corporation Limited 
Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust 
UOL Group Limited 
United Industrial Corporation Limited 
Wheelock Properties (Singapore) 
Limited 
Wing Tai Holdings Limited 
 
India 
Indian Hotels Company Limited 
Mahindra Lifespace Developers 
Limited 
Parsvnath Developers Limited 
Royal Orchid Hotels Limited 
 
New Zealand 
AMP NZ Office Limited 
Goodman Property Trust 
Kiwi Income Property Trust 
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